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FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION AND "RIGHT TO
WORK" LAWS
JOSEPH DI FEDE

THE current investigation by the Senate Select Committee on
Improper Activities in the Field of Labor-Management Relations has
brought renewed activity in several states for more restrictive labor
legislation. The testimony of several witnesses who have appeared
before this Committee pointing to unethical practices by some irresponsible labor leaders, and particularly the disclosures concerning
the manipulation of union funds, has created a public opinion unfavorable to the fight of organized labor against state "right to work"
laws and has strengthened the position of certain management groups
in states which up to the present time had been deemed as pro-labor.'
Of recent years organized labor seems to have abandoned its
campaign to repeal the Taft-Hartley law and accepted the proposal to
seek clarifying amendments thereto, in order to concentrate its efforts
on stopping the spread of state "right to work" laws and to seek their
repeal, in those states which have enacted them.
Some confusion in the public mind still exists as to the real
meaning of these "right to work" laws. Since we can easily see that
such laws do not in any sense attempt to guarantee a job2 to every
man, we shall describe briefly what such laws provide and how they
have come about.
The usual "right to work" law provides that (1) no one shall be
required to become or remain a union member in order to obtain or
continue his employment; (2) that no one shall be required to pay
dues or other fees to a labor organization unless he chooses to do so;
and (3) that collective agreements requiring such membership or payments as a condition of employment are unlawful. Basically, then,
such laws prohibit the closed shop, the union shop, the automatic dues
check-off and all other forms of union security clauses. Some of
JosEPH Di FEDE is Chairman, New York State Labor Relations Board and Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1 The Empire State Chamber of Commerce has recently advocated a "right to
work" law for New York State.
2 A letter addressed to the editor of the Denver Post in connection with an article
advocating a "right to work" law, stated as follows: "I noticed in the Post that the
Chamber of Commerce endorsed a state "right to work" law. I think the Chamber
is doing a fine thing by supporting such a law. For two months now I have been out
of work aid I think it is about time that we bad a state law that would guarantee a
man the right to work."
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these laws further expressly prohibit picketing, strikes and boycotts
where such action is designed to procure union security provisions.
To date, nineteen states have adopted "right to work" laws by
constitutional amendment or by specific statutory enactment. 3 This
year alone eleven states4 considered and either rejected or refused
to take action on such legislation. At the same time several other
states5 defeated attempts to repeal such laws. Supporters of these
laws have managed to secure their enactment on the local level6 in
California despite that state's policy which makes closed and union
shop agreements lawful.
Supporters of "right to work" legislation contend that these laws
protect the legal and moral right of a worker to refuse to join a union
as a condition of obtaining or retaining employment. They deny that
such laws are intended in any way to weaken or destroy unions. An
article which appeared in the April. 1956, issue of "The Guaranty
Survey", published by the Guaranty Trust Company of New York
stresses the view that the right to a job is a basic human right which
should not be restricted to union members. It further emphasizes the
thought that employment creates a contractual relationship in which
the employer and the employee should be free to deal with one another in full freedom.
Opponents of "right to work" laws argue vehemently that the
basic purpose of such laws is to break and destroy unions, thus lowering wages and standards of working conditions. They contend that
some form of union security is essential to the very survival of unions.
They cite the gains the average worker has achieved as a direct result
of the growth and strength of labor unions, gains which could not have
3 Florida-1944; South Dakota-1945; Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Nebraska,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia-1947; Alabama, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, and Utah-between 1952-1955; Indiana-1957.
The Legislature of the State of Louisiana repealed, in part, its "right to work" law in
1956.
4 Colorado, Wyoming, Connecticut, Delaware,
Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Ohio,
New Hampshire and California. Louisiana defeated a bill designed to introduce a
constitutional amendment reenacting a general "right to work" law.
5 Alabama, Iowa, Nebraka, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota and Utah.
O Right to Work ordinances were enacted this year in Tehama and San Benito
Counties. Enforcement of a right to work ordinance, enacted by the City of Palm
Springs, in November, 1956, was restrained in Stephenson v. City of Palm Springs, 39
L. R. R. M. 2393.
7 The Guaranty Survey-April, 1956, issue, states, among other things:
"What the 'right to work' really consists of is the right to sell one's services to the best
advantage. This, in the final analysis is simply the right to the fruits of one's own
labor. Its counterpart on the employer's side is the right to provide for his labor needs
on the most advantageous terms he can obtain."
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been achieved without some form of union security. They can point
to a statement in a recent Supreme Court decision which states, in
part, "one would have to be blind to history to assert that trade
unionism did not enhance and strengthen the right to work."8 They
can also quote from comments made by Professor Meyers of the University of Texas on the Texas "right to work" law; that the proponents of such a law hope to make unions insecure, slow down their
growth and destroy them. 9
In addition to the many and usual arguments for and against
such "right to work" laws, on the basis of natural, moral, economic
and sociological rights of the individual worker in his relationship to
the group, several serious articles have been written by legal scholars
who likewise are sharply divided in their viewpoints.
Within the past year two interesting articles have appeared in
the American Bar Association Journal on the issue of "right to work"
laws. In the August, 1956, issue of the said Journal, 10 J. A. McClain,
Jr., dean of the School of Law of Duke University, wrote a rather
lengthy article entitled "Compulsory 'Freedom' to Join a Union". In
his remarks the Dean is very critical of the Supreme Court decision
in the case of Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson," which declared invalid the Nebraska "right to work" law in so far as it conflicted with the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act, which
specifically permits a uinion security clause in the railway industry.
In this case the Supreme Court held that the aforesaid amendment
superseded the state "right to work" law.
Dean McClain's position seems to be that the union shop agreement violated the "right to work" law of the state, as well as the right
to work and freedom of association of individual workers guaranteed
by the First and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution. Since
the Hanson case was the first test of the validity of the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act permitting a union security clause
in a contract in the railway industry, and since it also involved the
8 Railway Employes' Department, A. F. of L. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 76 S. Ct.
714, 100 L. Ed. 1112 (1956).
9 Professor Meyers' remarks are cited in M. C. Benewitz's article, "The Rightto-Work Law Case" which appeared in 7 Lab. L. J. No. 1 (January, 1956), and which
read, in part, as follows: "It can reasonably be supposed that the proponents of rightto-work laws hope by their enactment to make unions more insecure--to slow down
or halt the rate at which unions are organized and to destroy existing unions,"
10 42 A. B. A. J. No. 8 (August, 1956).
11 351 U. S. 225, 76 S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1112 (1956); unanimous opinion by
Mr. Justice Douglas.
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question of whether or not such a Congressional Act superseded a
state's "right to work" law, many groups filed briefs amicus curiae12
with the Court.
In reversing the Supreme Court of Nebraska, the United States
Supreme Court discussed the wide powers of Congress to regulate labor
relations in industries engaged in interstate commerce and concluded
that Congress had the right to hold that the union shop was a stabilizing force in maintaining industrial and labor peace in the arteries
of commerce. Perhaps on the basis of the fact that Mr. Justice Frankfurter had written the majority opinion in an earlier case upholding
the validity of state "right to work" laws,'" he now felt constrained
to write a separate but concurring opinion in the Hanson case. He
justified his conclusion on the ground that the question presented
was one of legislative policy rather than a judicial one, and emphasized
the fact that the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor Act was a
legitimate exercise by Congress of its discretion to promote peaceful
industrial relations in the operation of interstate railroads.
Dean McClain disagrees with the Court in the Hanson case. He
maintains that "right to work" laws flow logically from the rights
guaranteed by the First and Fifth Amendments, and that the Court's
decision seems to have abridged these inalienable rights. He concludes
that the right of association sanctioned by the Court in cases involving
the right of employees to join a union 1 4 inferentially guarantees the
right of individuals to refrain from joining an association. The only
support for this view, however, is a statement which he quotes from a
decision in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Wyoming.'5
Stating a different point of view, Mr. Robert W, Gilbert, a member of the California Bar, wrote an article which appeared in the
March, 1957, issue of the American Bar Association Journal.' This
article is intended as a reply to Dean McClain, and it states rather
categorically that there is no constitutional right to refrain from join12 Briefs were filed by the Attorneys General of Nebraska, Florida, Mississippi,
Texas, South Carolina, Virginia, South Dakota and Utah; United States Chamber of
Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, National Right to Work Committee,
American Farm Bureau Federation, Southern Industrial Council, and General Committee of Railroad Employees; American Federation of Labor, Congress of Industrial
Organization and Railway Labor Executives' Association.
13 American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U. S. 538,
69 S. Ct. 258, 93 L. Ed. 228 (1949).
14 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 65 S. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430 (1945).
16 Hagen v. Culinary Workers Alliance, 73 Ida. 25, 246 P. 2d 778 (1952).
16 43 A. B. A. J. 231 (March, 1957).
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ing a union and that the problem of union security is rightfully within
the scope of Congressional authority.
The Congressional Act which permits a union security clause in
a contract between a union and an employer, 1 and the decision, of
the Supreme Court' 8 in the Hanson case indicate a strong reaffirmation
of the opinion expressed by many experts in the field of labor relations
that individual employees do not have the constitutional right to refrain from joining a union when membership is available to the?
on equal terms and without discrimination of any kind. There is no
legal authority that we have seen to support the opinion that the right
to join a union must of necessity imply the right not to join.
As a last general statement we will briefly discuss the issue raised
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right of an individual or
group to pursue a trade or occupation. This right is based on the
doctrine of equal opportunity and is not infringed by a reasonable
limitation which may limit an individual's freedom to pursue that
particular trade or occupation. The liberty to pursue a line of work
is based on the theory that no one should be denied the right to pursue
a trade or occupation because of race, color, national origin or ancestry.' We know of no decision which has as yet established the
principle that a union shop agreement which makes membership
available to all employees on the same terms and conditions is the type
of limitation condemned in the Truax, Tackahashiand Yick Wo cases.
Hence it may fairly be concluded that the question of "right to
work" laws does not involve a constitutional issue, but rather a matter
of legislative policy. In the 1951 amendment to the Railway Labor
17 The 1951 Amendment to the Railway Labor Act provides that "notwithstanding any other statute or law of the United States or territory thereof, or of any state,
any carrier and a labor organization duly designated and authorized to represent employees shall be permitted to make agreements requiring as a condition of continued
employment that within 60 days following the beginning of such employment, or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class."
18 Railway Employes' Department, A. F. of L. v. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 76
S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1112 (1956).
'9 In the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed.
292 (1886), the Supreme Court declared invalid a San Francisco ordinance which
barred Chinese aliens from engaging in the laundry business.
In the case of Truax v. Reich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131 (1915), the
Supreme Court declared invalid an Arizona Statute which required restaurant operators
to employ voters or natural born citizens in all restaurants having more than 5 employees.
In the case of Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U. S. 410, 68 S. Ct. 1138,
92 L. Ed. 1478 (1948), the Supreme Court held invalid a California Statute forbidding
the issuance of a license for commercial fishing to aliens ineligible for citizenship.
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Act, Congress clearly expressed a policy of permitting union security
clauses in the railway industry despite provisions of the state "right
to work" laws to the contrary. In the Taft-Hartley Act, however,
Congress adopted a different policy which has led to considerable
confusion.
In 1947, Congress amended the National Labor Relations Act by
enacting the Labor-Management Relations Act, 0 commonly known
as the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 8(a)3 of the Taft-Hartley Act, in
substance, prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
because of membership or non-membership in a labor organization
and section 8 (b) 2 makes it unlawful for a labor organization to cause,
or attempt to cause, an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of section 8(a)3. These outright prohibitions against discrimination, however, are limited by a provision which authorizes the
execution and application of collective agreements requiring union
membership as a condition of employment, provided, (1),the union
represents the majority of the employees in the appropriate unit, (2)
the union is in compliance with the filing requirements of section 9(f)
(g) and (h), (3) that an employee may not be required to join the
union until 30 days after employment or the effective date of the
agreement whichever is later, and (4) that no employee may be discharged for non-membership unless he has failed to tender the periodic dues and initiation fee required for membership in the union. 2
20 29 U. S. C. A. § 141 et seq.
21 § 8(a)(3) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer .. .by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter or any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to
require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the 30th day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement,
whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Section 9(a), in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit coy-ered by such agreement when made; and has at the time the agreement was made or
within the preceding twelve months received from the Board a notice of compliance
with sections 9(f), (g), (h),and (ii) ... : Provided further, That no employer shall
justify any discrimination against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not
available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to
other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership
was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender
the periodic-dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring
or retaining membership;" 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(a) (3).
§ 8(b) (2) "It shall be an. unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-- . . . to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
etnployee in violation of Subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate against
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At the same time, however, Congress also enacted section 14(b)
which provides that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State
or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by
State or Territorial law."
Thus, while section 8(a)3 permits a form of union security
clause, section 14(b) withdraws such authorization in states or territories in which union security clauses are prohibited by state "right to
work" laws. 2 2 Accordingly, the anomalous situation is presented of a
comprehensive federal law, designed to provide uniform regulation of
labor relations on a national scale, but which permit the States and
Territories to impose different and varying requirements as to the
validity of union security agreements.
The main purpose of this article is to examine (1) the extent to
which state "right to work" laws limit federal law and federal remedies, (2) the jurisdiction of the states to apply and enforce "right
to work" laws where interstate commerce is affected, and (3) the advisability and practicality of permitting the states or territories to impose their own varying standards in the field of union security clauses.
Federal regulation of labor relations was designed "to solve a
national problem on a national scale." 2 3 Indeed that concept-the
necessity for national uniformity and the avoidance of conflict between federal and state law-is the basis upon which the United
States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of pre-emption and
denied state jurisdiction in most portions of the field of labor relations.
Examination of the pre-emption decisions is necessary, therefore, to
ascertain the effect of state right to work laws on both federal and
state rights and remedies.
an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied
or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and
the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;" 29 U. S. C. A. § 158(b) (2).
22 Section 14(b) is also applicable to situations in which state laws permit union
security clauses but under more restrictive requirements than are imposed by §§ 8(a)3
and 8(b)2 of the Taft-Hartley Act. In such cases, a union security clause to be valid
must meet the requirements of both federal and state law. See, Algoma Plywood Co.
v. Wisconsin Board, 336 U. S. 301, 69 S. Ct. 584, 93 L. Ed. 691 (1949); Matter of
Western Electric Company, Inc., 84 N. L. R. B. 1019, 1022 n. 14. This article, however, is concerned primarily with the effect of state laws which prohibit all forms of
union security agreements.
23 N. L. R. B. v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 123, 64 S. Ct. 851, 88 L. Ed.
1173 (1943).
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Up to 1947, State Labor Relations Boards had asserted their
jurisdiction in labor-management disputes affecting interstate commerce under the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction first upheld by
the New York and Wisconsin Courts in the Davega and Rueping
cases 2 4 But in 1947, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled these decisions in two cases involving representation proceedings
conducted by state boards, on the ground that the National Labor
Relations Board had, and would have asserted, jurisdiction over the
employers involved. Its decisions, based on the ground of potential
conflict, struck down the previous theory of concurrent jurisdiction
under which all states previously had acted 2 5
The doctrine of pre-emption was extended to cases involving unfair labor'practice proceedings in the subsequent case of Plankinton
Packing Co. v. Wisconsin Board, where the United States Supreme
Court again reaffirmed its rulings in the Bethlehem and La Crosse
cases that where the employer's operations affect interstate commerce,
and the National Labor Relations Board would take jurisdiction, the
states are not permitted to process-such matters.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court in Garnerv. Teamsters26 extended
its doctrine of pre-emption to court injunctions against picketing by
unions. In what has become the leading case on this subject, the
Supreme Court upheld a decision of Pennsylvania's highest court
which vacated an injunction issued by a lower court against picketing
by a minority union, the purpose of which allegedly was to force the
employer to compel his employees to join that union. This decision i§
so important, and goes so far in its statement of the doctrine of preemption, that it is well to consider the following remarks by the Court
at page 490:
"Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be
enforced by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the
parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation and application
of its rules to a specific and specially constituted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investigation, complaint and notice,
and hearing and decision, including judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress evidently considered that centralized ad24 Davega-City Radio, Inc. v. N. Y. S. L. R. B., 281 N. Y. 13, 22 N. E. 2d
(1948); Wisconsin Labor Relations Board v. Rueping Co., 228 Wis. 473, 279 N.
673 (1938).
25 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. Labor Relations Board, 330 U. S. 767, 67 S.
1026, 91 L. Ed. 1234 (1947); La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin E. R. B.,
U. S. 18, 69 S. Ct. 379, 93 L. Ed. 463 (1949).
26 346 U. S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 461, 92 L. Ed. 228 (1953).

145
W.
Ct.
336
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ministration of specially designed procedures was necessary to obtain
uniform application of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures
and attitudes toward labor controversies. . . .A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce incompatible and conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law. The same reasoning which prohibits federal courts from
intervening in such cases except by way of review or on application
of the federal Board precludes state courts from doing so. Cf. Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 82 L. Ed. 638, 58
S. Ct. 459; Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison
Co., 309 U. S. 261, 84 L. Ed. 738, 60 S.Ct. 561. And the reasons for
excluding state administrative bodies from assuming control of matters expressly placed within the competence of the federal Board also
excludes state courts from like action. Cf. Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
N. Y. S. L. R. B., 330 U. S.767, 91 L. Ed. 1234, 67 S.Ct. 1026."
The Supreme Court took another long step in the application of
the doctrine of pre-emption in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch,2 7 decided
March 28, 1955. There, the employer obtained an injunction against
picketing on the ground that its purpose was unlawful under the state
anti-trust laws. In support of state jurisdiction, the employer contended that the relief was granted, not for any reason having to do
with labor relations, but under a state law of general application dealing with restraints of trade. The Supreme Court rejected the argument and held that "where the facts reasonably bring the controversy
within the sections [of the Taft-Hartley Act] prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may
be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that
Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in
28
the first instance.1
The full impact of the doctrine of pre-emption became apparent
in three decisions issued by the Supreme Court on March 25, 1957.
All three cases presented the question of state jurisdiction over labor
disputes affecting commerce, where the National Board declines jurisdiction because of the predominantly local nature of the controversy.
The first case, Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board," involved an
employer's refusal to bargain with a union which represented a major27 348 U. S. 468, 75 S. Ct. 480, 99 L. Ed. 846 (1954).

28 348 U. S. 127, 481; Compare Giboney v. Empire Storage Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490,
69 S. Ct. 684, 93 L. Ed. 834 (1948) where no question of effect on interstate commerce was presented.
29 353 U. S. 1,
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ity of the employees in an appropriate unit. The other cases, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. FairlawnMeats, Inc.,30 and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmo73' were appeals from state court injunctions against picketing by non-representative unions for recognition and a contract including a union security clause. In each case,
the Supreme Court held that the state board or court was without
jurisdiction, even though the National Board would not act.
The real significance of these three decisions lies in the fact that
the Supreme Court of the United States knowingly and deliberately
created a vast no-man's land where the states cannot assert jurisdiction over labor disputes in cases affecting commerce, even when the
National Board declines or refuses to assert its jurisdiction. This may
seem an intolerable situation, but, as the Supreme Court has said, it
is something which only Congress can remedy by legislation. However, the Court has made it clear that under the present National
Labor Relations Act the states may not regulate labor disputes which
affect commerce.3 2
The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
foregoing cases clearly point to the conclusion that generally state
boards and state courts have no jurisdiction in matters which affect
interstate commerce and which involve conduct which is either protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations and Taft-Hartley Acts. 3 There remains for our consideration the effect of section
14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act on state jurisdiction to enforce right
to work laws.
Section 14(b), as previously shown, runs counter to the provision in section 8 (a)3 which permits a union shop agreement, under the
conditions specified therein, by stating that "Nothing in this Act shall
be considered as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment in any State or Territory, in which such execution or
30 353 U. S. 20,
31 353 U. S. 26,

2 There are two exceptions, not relevant here, namely (1) The states retain their
police power jurisdiction to prevent violence and mass picketing (U. A. W. v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Bd., 351 U. S. 266, 76 S. Ct. 714, 100 L. Ed. 1162 (1955)) and
(2) state courts have jurisdiction over actions to recover damages for tortious picketing,
and unlawful secondary boycotts or jurisdictional disputes (United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U. S. 656, 74 S. Ct. 833, 98 L. Ed. 1825 (1953);
Taft-Hartley Act, § 303).
33 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S. 20; Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, 348 U. S. 468, 75 S. Ct. 480, 99 L. Ed. 546 (1954); Garner v. Teamsters C & H Union, 346 U. S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 461, 98 L. Ed. 228 (1953).
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application is prohibited. . . ."" Does section 14(b) mean that States
or Territories which prohibit or have more restrictive provisions concerning union security agreements may apply and enforce their law
in labor disputes which arise within their boundaries regardless of
their effect on interstate commerce?
Let us consider briefly the application of sections 8(a)3, 8(b)2
and 14(b) in typical cases which have arisen. For the purpose of this
discussion we refer only to cases which affect interstate commerce.
First we shall consider cases involving minority unions, that is,
where the union does not represent a majority of the employees in the
appropriate unit. Under the provisions of sections 8(a)3 and 8(b)2 a
minority union may neither seek nor obtain any type of union security
clause, since it fails to meet the federal requirement that such agreements are authorized only where the union represents a majority of
the employees in an appropriate unit. Minority union picketing to obtain a union security clause violates section 8 (b) 2 of the Taft-Hartley
Act, and the execution and application of a union security contract
with a non-representative union violates both section 8(a)3 and
section 8(b)2. In both types of situations the National Board's jurisdiction is exclusive even though the picketing may violate state law. 85
Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that picketing by a minority union to force the employer to compel his employees to join the
union is conduct prohibited under the National Act and subject exclusively to N. L. R. B. jurisdiction.36 Federal jurisdiction is exclusive
even if the picketing is unlawful under state law. That was the situation in the Garner case.
In I. B. E. W. v. Farnsworth& Chambers Company, Inc.,37 picketing to compel the discharge of non-union employees and to compel
the hiring of union members was held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Board. In the Farnsworth case, the Tennessee
Court had enjoined the picketing as violative of the state right to
work law and cited section 14(b) as justification for its exercise of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment simultaneously with its grant of certiorari, merely citing the Garner and Weber
cases.
34 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 164(b).
35 Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U. S. 20; Building
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U. S. 26.
36 Garner v. Teamsters C & H Union, 346 U. S. 485, 74 S. Ct. 461, 98 L. Ed.

228 (1953).
37 40 L. R. R. M. 2106.
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The Supreme Court decisions discussed above, in which federal
jurisdiction was held to be exclusive, involved the same types of situations in which state "right to work" laws previously had been used
as the basis for state court injunctions. It seems clear, therefore,
that where minority unions are concerned, the combination of a state
right to work law and section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act, do not
give rise to state jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction is exclusive and
the sole remedy is that available under federal law.
Where the union does represent a majority of the employees in a
business affecting interstate commerce, the existence of a right to work
law does not necessarily confer state jurisdiction to grant relief against
activities in violation thereof. In the absence of a valid union security
clause the discharge of an employee for non-membership in a majority
union, has been held to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
N. L. R. B.38 A discharge pursuant to a union security clause which
does not meet the requirements of section 8(a)3, whether or not it is
lawful under state law, would be a violation of the Taft-Hartley Act,
and within the jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B. Similarly, picketing or
other efforts by a majority union to obtain a union security clause
which does not meet the requirements set forth in section 8(a)3,
whether or not lawful under state law, is conduct prohibited by the
Federal Act and within the jurisdiction of the N. L. R. B.
It would appear, therefore, that efforts by a majority union to
obtain or apply a union security clause which does not meet the requirements of section 8(a) 3 of that Act, even if such picketing should
occur in a state with a "right to work" law, are violations of federal
law and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Board.
There remains but one additional type of situation to be considered. What would happen in a case where a majority union seeks
to obtain or enforce a union security clause which meets the requirements of section 8(a)3 but which is prohibited by state law?
As previously mentioned, sections 8(a)3 and 8(b)2 of the TaftHartley Act prohibit discrimination for non-membership in a union
except pursuant to a lawful union security clause in a contract with a
majority union. Section 8(a)3 specifies certain conditions which must
be met for the contract to be lawful. But section 14(b) adds another
condition, for it provides that "Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
38 Plankinton Packing Co. v. Wisconsin E. R. B., 338 U. S. 953, 70 S. Ct. 479,
94 L. Ed. 588 (1950).
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membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in
any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial Law." Reading sections 8(a)3 and
14(b) together, it would seem apparent that to be lawful under federal law, a union security clause must meet the requirements of section 8(a)3 and be permitted by state law. Bothz conditions must be
met in order to escape the Taft-Hartley Act's prohibition against discrimination for non-membership in a union. If both are not met, is
there not a violation of federal law within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Board? 39
It is true, of course, that in Algoma Plywood Co. v. Wisconsin
Board,4" the Supreme Court upheld state jurisdiction over a discharge
pursuant to a union security clause invalid under Wisconsin law. In
that case, however, the discharge occurred before the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act. While the Supreme Court's opinion discusses
section 14(b), no question was raised as to the existence of a federal
remedy or its effect upon state jurisdiction. Since then, as previously
discussed, the Supreme Court has greatly expanded the doctrine of preemption, emphasizing that Congress intended a uniform application
of its substantive rules to avoid the diversities and conflicts likely to
result from a variety of local procedures, and that the provisions of
the Taft-Hartley Act are to be administered and enforced exclusively
by the National Board.
By enacting the Taft-Hartley Act Congress has enunciated a
national policy to promote the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and thus eliminate the interruptions to the free flow of
commerce which result from industrial strife. Although labor management disputes are a matter of both state and national concern, Congress has indicated a national solution to the problem and has created
a National Labor Relations Board to apply definitive procedures and
remedies in order to achieve national uniformity.
If our analysis is correct, section 14(b) confers little or no jurisdiction on states to enforce their "right to work" laws. We have seen
that picketing or discharges that violate such laws also violate the
provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law and are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The only effect of
such laws is, therefore, to bar union security clauses which would
89 See Giant Food Stores, 77 N. L. R. B. 791.
40 336 U. S. 301, 69 S. Ct. 584, 93 L. Ed. 691 (1948).
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otherwise be lawful under section 8 (a)3 of the federal law. How then
is Congress encouraging uniformity in its labor relations policy on a
national scale by having two such inconsistent provisions in its Act?
Section 14(b) destroys the declared policy of Congress to seek
uniformity in its regulation of labor relations. It permits variations
from state to state. It interferes with the proper functioning
of collective bargaining in multi-state units and discourages bargaining between unions and employers who may have plants in more than
one state. It leads to uncertainties in the relations between an employer and the majority of his employees. It leads to raiding by rival
unions. It leads to the undermining of unions by some employers. It
forces certain unions to become irresponsible in their promises and
thus creates discontent among workers who might feel that in the absence of such "right to work" laws their demands could be satisfied. It
leads to competition between the states in their attempts to attract industries from states whose policies are more consonant with the national
policy as to union security. It breeds sectional rivalry between the
industrial North and the less industrial South.
Furthermore, section 14(b) also discourages the collective bargaining process by guaranteeing the right not to join a union despite
the choice of a majority of the employees to be represented by such a
union. Finally, it raises the possibility of conflict between one employee and his fellow employees and results in clashes of opinion and
more, in recriminations, in abuses and name calling and in labor strife
leading to the picket line and strike.
The basic objectives of the Taft-Hartley Act are to eliminate the
sources of labor disputes by encouraging collective bargaining and to
provide uniform laws and procedures on a national scale. Manifestly,
section 14(b) furthers neither of these purposes. If the Federal
Government has pre-empted the field of labor relations to such a large
extent it should not permit the uniformity of its regulations to be disrupted by encouraging "right to work" laws.

